Opinion Digest: Coach awarded $200K; court splits on defamation definition

By Rasmus S. Jorgensen

A public high school football coach is not a public official, as they have no influence on government issues of importance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina decided in a reversal that secures a former coach $200,000 in damages for defamation.

The Berkeley High School coach and athletic director, Jeffrey L. Cruce, was relieved of those duties in December 2015 and made a guidance counselor, following a challenging season. Cruce had become a hot topic in some sports media that season due to a controversial no-punt policy, but the district never told the public why Cruce was reassigned.

In January 2016, athletic trainer Chris Stevens sent an email to administrators, athletic department employees and volunteer coaches — 45 people in total — stating he had looked through student files left behind by Cruce and found there could be some of those documents that “could be misplaced and others that are out of order. From a liability standpoint with competing sports and athletes, it is necessary that all of the files be present to safeguard the athletes as well as to maintain the proper care for those athletes if something were to happen.”

Stevens’ email went on to say he would be working to ensure that all files were in order and asked the recipients to send him copies of their rosters for any athletes who were competing or conditioning at the time.

The Berkeley County School District argued that Cruce had not proved that the email was defamatory, but a Berkeley County jury had found otherwise, awarding Cruce $200,000. Since the Supreme Court was reviewing the Circuit Court’s denial of the district’s motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court had to uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was supported by any evidence.

The majority opinion, authored by Justice D. Garrison Hill with Chief Justice Donald W. Beatty and Justice John W. Kittredge concurring, said a reasonable person could read the email as suggesting that Cruce was incompetent at filing and managing, even though the district argued Stevens had only said that certain documents “could” be missing. The court also noted the use of what the majority called “the ‘liability’ buzzword,” which it said added a suggestion of illegality.

The district also argued that there was no evidence that Stevens’ comments were false. However, the burden of proving that allegedly defamatory statements are true is on the defendant, and the jury was instructed, without objection, that the truth was a defense. Cruce told the jury that the files and recordkeeping had recently passed a state audit, and the jury sided with him. The Supreme Court noted there was “abundant evidence” the jury could have used to find the email contained false statements.

Justice George C. James Jr. and Justice John Cannon Few disagreed with their colleagues that the defamation claim was supported by evidence.

“Such a mild critique of Cruce’s paperwork skills is not in any sense defamatory,” wrote James.

Not a public official

The Court of Appeals found that Cruce, due to his status as a high school football coach and athletic director, was a public official and that he therefore had to prove actual malice to prevail, in accordance with New York Times v. Sullivan. Further, under the South Carolina Torts Claim Act, the district would be immune from loss arising from employee conduct constituting actual malice.

The Supreme Court had never before considered, in a defamation context, if a high school football coach was a public official, though it has previously ruled that an assistant high school principal is not. The district argued that Cruce’s public employment and the significant media attention he received proved he was a public official.

But media coverage of a public employee does not a public official make, according to the Supreme Court, which said that description is reserved for public employees with official influence on serious issues of public policy or core government functions, such as public health, budgeting or infrastructure.

“Fielding a football team or devising an offensive strategy is not the type of public issue envisioned by the Framers of the First Amendment. Baseball may be the national pastime, but it and other sports are just that: pastimes. They are not forums for civic concerns, and sports figures — regardless of how far and wide their fame may spread — are not public officials,” the majority said, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision and vacating part of the 2019 Court of Appeals ruling that held a coach was a public official in Garrard v. Charleston County School District.

The court also found that Cruce was not a limited public figure, which would have also required him to prove actual malice. In making that finding, the court constructed a new test to replace the test known from Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers, which the court described as awkward.

To determine if Cruce is a public figure, the court said it would consider three things:

• Whether he voluntarily injected himself into and played a prominent role in a public controversy, defined as a controversy whose resolution affects a substantial segment of the public.
• Whether the defamation occurred after Cruce voluntarily entered the controversy and while he was still embroiled in it.
• Whether the defamation was related to the controversy.

Here, the court said Cruce is not a public figure because his punt-free policy did not affect large segments of society, and even if it had, the email was about his paperwork, not coaching.

In his separate opinion, James said he agreed with the majority that Cruce was neither a public official nor a public figure. Few said he would not reach the question, since he found no defamation. Few also criticized the majority for replacing the Erickson test.

“For reasons not explained by the majority, addressed in the briefs of the parties, nor mentioned at oral argument, the majority changes the words of our Erickson test for when a person becomes a limited public figure. The majority’s proposed change is not substantive and will not affect the outcome of any cases. While it is always beneficial for courts to attempt to better articulate law we use to decide cases, this particular ‘change’ accomplishes nothing,” Few wrote.

The case is Cruce v. Berkeley County School District, 28186. •